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Casenote
The "Positive Effect" Escape Hatch: The
Eleventh Circuit's New View of the Catalyst
Theory and the Resulting Difficulty for
Plaintiffs to Receive Attorney Fees

I.

INTRODUCTION

Environmental plaintiffs now have fewer opportunities to receive
attorney fees in the wake of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Friendsof the Everglades v. South Florida
Water Management District' (Friendsof the Everglades II). In this case
the court further narrowed what plaintiffs' civil suits must accomplish
to have a "positive catalytic effect." 2 While many circuits, including the
Eleventh Circuit, have focused on what it means for a party to be a
"prevailing party" under various statutory schemes,' and thus receive
attorney fees, this case marks the first time the Eleventh Circuit has
defined what is sufficient to constitute a change for purposes of the
positive catalyst theory when reading the Clean Water Act's "whenever
... appropriate'" language in conjunction with this theory.5 In this
case the court held that when a plaintiff's lawsuit spurs an agency to

1. 678 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2012).
2. Id. at 1202.
3. The language in environmental statutes provides for two different standards to
determine when fee-shifting occurs: the "prevailing or substantially prevailing party"
standard and the "whenever... appropriate" standard. Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst
Calamity: Post-Buckhannon Fee-Shifting in EnvironmentalLitigation and a Proposalfor
CongressionalAction, 29 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 11-12 (2004). The "appropriate" standard
is more common in environmental statutes, but the positive catalyst theory plays a role in
both standards. Id. at 12-13. While this Note will address the positive catalyst theory in
the "whenever... appropriate" standard's context, the theory's history with regards to the
"prevailing party" standard is also important.
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006).
5. Friendsof the Everglades11, 678 F.3d at 1201-02; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
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make new rules that are adverse to the plaintiff's position, the lawsuit
will not be considered to have a positive catalytic effect and, thus,
attorney fees are not "appropriate. 6
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2002, various environmental groups brought a suit to stop the
South Florida Water Management District from pumping polluted canal
water into a local lake.' The plaintiffs wanted to force the Water
District to obtain a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit under the Clean Water Act, which requires all "point
sources" to apply for a permit when they "discharge[, or add,] any
pollutant" into "navigable waters." Point source, discharge, pollutant,
and navigable waters are all specifically defined under the Clean Water
Act, and the controversy centered on whether transferring contaminated
water from one navigable water-the canal-to another navigable
water-the lake-constituted an "addition of [a] pollutant to navigable

waters

....

,9

The district court ruled in favor of the environmental groups, finding
that pumping polluted water from one navigable water to another was
a "discharge" under the Clean Water Act. 10 Accordingly, the district
court issued an injunction to stop the Water District from transferring
the polluted water." The Water District appealed, but before the case
was resolved, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated
a new rule that specifically excluded water transfers from the requirement to obtain NPDES permits. 2 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit

6. Friendsof the EvergladesII, 678 F.3d at 1202.
7. Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th
Cir. 2009) (Friendsof the EvergladesI).
8. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a), (e), 1362(7), 1362(12) (2006).
9. Friendsof the Everglades I, 570 F.3d at 1216; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
10. Friendsof the EvergladesI, 570 F.3d at 1215; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
11. Friendsof the EvergladesI, 570 F.3d at 1215.
12. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule,
73 Fed. Reg. 33697-01 (June 13, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i) (Aug. 12, 2008)
("Water transfer means an activity that conveys or connects waters of the United States
without subjecting the transferred water to intervening industrial, municipal, or
commercial use.")).
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gave Chevron" deference
to EPA's new rule and reversed the district
14
court's injunction.
That reversal influenced the court's decision in Friends of the
Everglades H. After the Eleventh Circuit overturned the injunctive
relief to the environmental groups, the district court denied the
plaintiffs' request for attorney fees, concluding the environmental groups
were not a "prevailing party" on appeal. 5 The environmental groups
then appealed that subsequent denial of attorney fees.16 The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed, holding that attorney fees were not appropriate because
the environmental groups' suit had no positive catalytic effect on the
EPA's actions.' 7
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Catalyst Theory Under the "PrevailingParty"Standard
In 1970, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was
the first to articulate the catalyst theory in Parhamv. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., although the case did not involve an environmental
statute. In that case the plaintiff claimed his employer had violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'9 by engaging in racially

13. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The
decision in Chevron set out a two-part test for whether courts will defer to an agency's
interpretation of its rules and regulations promulgated under the statute that the agency
is tasked with administering. Id. at 842-43. The first question is whether the statute is
ambiguous; if not, then the court makes no further inquiry and defers to Congress's clear
intent. Id. On the other hand, if the court determines the statute is ambiguous or silent
on the issue at hand, then the court continues to the second part of the test-whether the
agency's interpretation is reasonable. Id. In Friendsof the Everglades I, the court of
appeals reached the second part of the Chevron test and held that EPA's interpretation
regarding water transfers was reasonable. 570 F.3d at 1227-28.
14. Friendsof the Everglades 1, 570 F.3d at 1227-28; see Friendsof the EvergladesII,
678 F.3d at 1201.
15. Friends of the EvergladesII, 678 F.3d at 1201. The Clean Water Act's citizen suit
section provides attorney fees "to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party,
whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
16. Friends of the Everglades11, 678 F.3d at 1200-01.
17. Id. at 1202.
18. 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); see Marisa L. Ugalde, The Futureof Environmental
Citizen Suits After Buckhannon Board & CareHome, Inc. v. West Virginia Departmentof
Health & Human Resources, 8 ENvTL. L. 589, 599 (2002) ("The first judicial articulation of
the catalyst theory of fee shifting occurred inParhamv. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.");
Joel H. Trotter, The Catalyst Theory of Civil Rights Fee ShiftingAfter Farrar v. Hobby, 80
VA. L. REV. 1429, 1434 (1994) (identifying Parham as "the first judicial articulation of
catalyst theory").
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).

1114

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

discriminatory employment practices.2"
Before the district court
rendered its judgment, the company stopped its discriminatory
conduct.21 Accordingly, the court of appeals declined to issue an
injunction but awarded attorney fees for two reasons."
First, "[the
plaintiff's] lawsuit acted as a catalyst which prompted the [defendant]
to take action . ..."" Second, the plaintiff "performed a valuable
public service in bringing [his] 'action."24 Thus, the original catalyst
theory applied only to the fee-shifting provision in Title VII and required
a plaintiff's suit to cause the defendant to positively and voluntarily
alter his or her conduct towards the plaintiff.25
Four years later, in 1974, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit extended the catalyst theory to environmen6
tal litigation in Wilderness Society v. Morton."
The plaintiff in
Wilderness Society successfully sued to halt construction of the transAlaska pipeline.27 As a result of that litigation, Congress amended the
Mineral Leasing Act of 192028 to specifically permit construction of the
pipeline.2 9 While the main issue and holding concerned the private
attorney general theory, which is no longer a viable method under which
plaintiffs may receive attorney fees, the court of appeals relied on
Parham to adopt the catalyst theory.30 Notably, the court took a
different viewpoint than the Eighth Circuit regarding what constitutes
a positive change.31 Whereas the Eighth Circuit defined positive
change from the plaintiff's perspective-that the defendant's voluntary
actions must align with what the plaintiff originally sought in the lawsuit 32 -the District of Columbia Circuit defined positive change from
society's viewpoint.33 The court reasoned that the plaintiff's lawsuit
had a positive catalytic effect because it had indirectly caused Congress

20. Parham,433 F.2d at 422-24; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
21. Parham,433 F.2d at 429.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 430.
25. Id. at 429-30.
26. 495 F.2d 1026, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
27. Id. at 1028.
28. Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 (codified in scattered sections of Title 30 of the
United States Code).
29. Id.; see also Wilderness Society, 495 F.2d at 1033.
30. Wilderness Society, 495 F.2d at 1034 ("Where litigation serves as a catalyst to effect
change and thereby achieves a valuable public service, an award of fees may be appropriate
even though the suit never proceeds to a successful conclusion on the merits.").
31. Id. at 1034-35.
32. Parham, 433 F.2d at 429-30.
33. Wilderness Society, 495 F.2d at 1034-35.
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to take action: "[forcing [the defendant] to go to Congress to amend the
1920 Act certainly was not a sterile exercise in legal technicalities devoid
of public significance."3 4 Overall, the District of Columbia Circuit's
1974 decision both extended the catalyst theory to environmental
lawsuits and expanded the theory's positive-change aspect to include the
value to society.35
Shortly after these two circuits adopted this method for awarding
attorney fees, the United States Supreme Court indirectly halted the
spread of the common law catalyst theory in its Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society36 decision. 37 Although the Court did not
consider the catalyst theory in that case, Justice White's majority
opinion held that only the legislature, not the judiciary, may award
attorney fees to prevailing litigants through statutory authorization. 8
The Court reasoned that the only exceptions to the American
rule-which states that generally each party to a lawsuit pays for its
own litigation costs, including attorney fees-had previously been
mandated by Congress through legislation.39 Therefore, federal courts
"[were] not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to the
allowance of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in federal litigation
...

depending upon the courts' assessment of the importance of the

public policies involved in particular cases." '
Congress responded swiftly. In 1976, federal legislators passed the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act 4' in response to the Supreme
Court's Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. decision.42 Although the relevant
statutory language did not mention the catalyst theory by name,43 this
legislation created a broad authorization for attorney fee awards in a
variety of civil rights cases." Importantly, Congress implicitly recognized the catalyst theory by citing Parham with approval in Senate
Report No. 94-1011. 4' The report also mentioned a number of environ-

34. Id. at 1033.
35. Id. at 1033-35 ('The proper functioning of our system of government under the
Constitution is, of course, important to every American, and in this sense [the plaintiffs]
suit had great therapeutic value.").
36. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
37. See Ugalde, supra note 18, at 595-97.
38. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 421 U.S. at 271.
39. Id. at 269.
40. Id.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
42. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 1 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908-09.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,

other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. . .
44. Id.
45. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5912-13.
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mental statutes with "[s]imilar standards [as the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Award Act] ... providing for attorneys' fees," suggesting that

Congress also contemplated the catalyst theory for environmental
litigation, not solely civil rights litigation.4 6
After such congressional authorization, all the circuit courts of appeal
adopted the catalyst theory, albeit in civil rights litigation. For example,
the United States Courts of Appeal for the First and Seventh Circuits
soon recognized the catalyst theory for awarding attorney fees in civil
rights litigation under various sections of Title 42, consistent with the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act.48 Additionally, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit placed great weight on the
Act's legislative history by stating that "the Senate Report directs that
[plaintiffs] be awarded fees" when their "lawsuit 'acted as a catalyst
which prompted the [defendant] to take action."'4 9 By the end of 1990,
the remaining federal courts of appeal followed suit and joined the First,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits in applying
the catalyst theory.5 °
Even the Supreme Court implicitly adopted the catalyst test after
Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, but not in
the context of environmental litigation.5 ' In its Hanrahan v.Hamp-

46. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5912.
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 2000e (2006).
48. Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 78-79 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing Parham,433 F.2d at
429-30) ("[The plaintiffs lawsuit] thus operated as a catalyst prompting the defendants to
institute fair employment practices. Accordingly, we find the plaintiffs to be prevailing
parties in this action."); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing
Parham, 433 F.2d 421; S. REP. No. 94-1011) ("It is often explained that when plaintiffs
lawsuit acts as a 'catalyst' in prompting defendants to take action to meet plaintiffs claims,
attorney's fees are justified despite the lack of judicial involvement in the result.").
49. Am. Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting
Parham,433 F.2d at 429-30).
50. See, e.g., Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (6th Cir.
1990); Dunn v. Fla. Bar, 889 F.2d 1010, 1013 (11th Cir. 1989); Institutionalized Juveniles
v. Sec'y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 910 (3d Cir. 1985); Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 739
F.2d 755, 758-59 (2d Cir. 1984) ("To justify an award of [attorney] fees, the prevailing party
must show a causal connection between the relief obtained and the litigation in which fees
are sought. [citations omitted] A causal connection exists if the plaintiffs lawsuit was 'a
catalytic, necessary, or substantial factor in attaining the relief.'"); Robinson v. Kimbrough,
652 F.2d 458, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[Pllaintiffs may recover attorneys' fees if their
lawsuit is a substantial factor or a significant catalyst in motivating the defendants to end
their unconstitutional behavior."); Chicano Police Officers Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127,
131 (10th Cir. 1980); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Parham,
433 F.2d at 429-30).
51. See Ugalde, supra note 18, at 597-98.
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ton 52 decision, the Court interpreted the term "prevailing party" in the
Act's attorney fee provision for civil rights litigation."3 The Court cited
the legislative history of the Act, specifically Senate Report No. 94-1011,
implying the catalyst test was an acceptable method of recovering
attorney fees.'
However, the Supreme Court seemed to indirectly rattle the foundation of the catalyst theory-despite unanimity among the circuit courts,
many of which had cited Hanrahan,that attorney fees are available
under the catalyst theory-when Justice Thomas wrote the majority
opinion in Farrar v. Hobby.5" Although the Court did not directly
address the catalyst theory or consider "prevailing party" status in the
context of environmental litigation in Farrar,the majority held that
nominal damages-which "modifLy] the defendant's behavior for the
plaintiff's benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of money
he otherwise would not pay""6 -are no grounds for awarding attorney
fees.57 Moreover, the precedents relied upon by the majority were the
catalyst theory, thus
same cases that supported the development of the
58
calling the catalyst theory's basis into question.
The plaintiff in Farrarsued state government officials for closing the
troubled youth school he operated and depriving him of procedural due
process. Although the jury found the defendant government official had
deprived Farrar of a civil right, it also found the deprivation was not a
proximate cause of Farrar's injury, thus rendering the plaintiff
unsuccessful at trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit remanded to the district court for entry of judgment of nominal
damages, based on the jury's finding of a civil rights deprivation. Farrar
then sued for attorney fees since he technically was awarded nominal
relief.59 The Supreme Court ultimately denied attorney fees to Farrar,
holding that the "plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the merits of
his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by
modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the
plaintiff.' ° The Court defined "relief' as "an enforceable judgment
against the defendant from whom fees are sought, or comparable relief

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

446 U.S. 754 (1980).
Id. at 756-58.
Id. at 756-57; S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5912.
506 U.S. 103 (1992).
Id. at 113.
Id. at 115.
See id. at 109-12.
Id. at 105-07.
Id. at 111-12.
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through a consent decree or settlement."6 1 However, the Court noted
that its prior precedent required a "generous formulation" of the term
"prevailing party." 2
This decision created a split among the federal circuit courts in 1994.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in light of
Farrar,overruled its prior holding in Bonnes v. Long,63 the case in
which that circuit had adopted the catalyst theory. In S-1 & S-2 v. State
Board of Education of North Carolina,4 the court of appeals expressly
overruled its prior decision in Bonnes by citing Farrar,holding that
"[t]he fact that a lawsuit may operate as a catalyst for post-litigation
changes in a defendant's conduct cannot suffice to establish plaintiff as
a prevailing party. 'Catalyst theory,' allowing that result, is no longer
available for that purpose .

. . ."6

Additionally, the Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit, while originally holding that the catalyst test
66 later wavered on that holding
survived Farrar,
in its Board of
Education of Downers Grove Grade School DistrictNo. 58 v. Steven L.67
decision and implicitly questioned whether the catalyst theory is still
available." Although the Seventh Circuit's language in Downers Grove
"at least questions the viability of the catalyst test,"69 the court did
not
70
cite or overrule its prior holding that applied the catalyst theory.
The remaining circuit courts also questioned the continued viability of
the catalyst test to prevailing parties after Farrar,but no others rejected
the catalyst theory. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, declined to
extend Farrarto eliminate the catalyst test when it decided Morris v.
City of West Palm Beach,71 noting that it joined the majority of the

61. Id. at 111 (internal citations omitted).
62. Id. at 109.
63. 599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979).
64. 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994).
65. Id. at 51.
66. See Zinn v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1994) ("We agree that Farrardoes
not preclude the award of fees when plaintiffs attain the relief they seek through
defendants' voluntary action. We simply find it implausible that the Supreme Court meant
to abolish a rule employed by nearly every circuit and previously recognized by the Court
itself as 'settled law,' without expressly indicating that it was doing so.").
67. 89 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 1996).
68. See id. at 469 ("The outcome of this suit resulted in no enforceable obligations for
the school district. Any relief that Andrew and his parents received was not in the form of
a judgment or settlement. Thus ... Andrew and his parents cannot be considered to have
substantially prevailed, and no attorneys fees or costs will be awarded to them under the
applicable federal statute.").
69. Morris v. City of W. Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 1206 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999).
70. See Downers Grove, 89 F.3d at 468-69.
71. 194 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 1999).
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other circuits that had already addressed the issue.7" The court
reasoned, along with the other circuits, that Farrardid not mention the
catalyst test and concerned an issue regarding the degree of relief, not
the form of relief.73 The court also pointed out that the Farrarmajority's "broad language ... [did] not indicate how it would rule on the
question of whether a showing that a plaintiff's lawsuit caused the
defendant to act... can justify a fee award." 4 Because of the catalyst
test's "long history and the important policies undergirding [it]," the
Eleventh Circuit did not abolish the catalyst theory.75
The most recent blow to the catalyst theory's application came in 2001
when the Supreme Court decided Buckhannon Board and Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources.76
Before that case, the catalyst theory gave plaintiffs greater opportunity
to receive attorney fees because it did not require a "judicially sanctioned
change in the parties' legal relationship."77 In that case, the Supreme
Court directly addressed the catalyst test under the "prevailing party"
standard in civil rights statutes,78 holding that plaintiffs may not
receive an award of attorney fees using the catalyst test.79 The Court

reasoned that a plaintiff only prevails when he "has been awarded some
relief by the court," including a judgment, consent decree, or settlement."o Thus, civil rights plaintiffs could no longer recover simply
because their litigation brought about a voluntary change in the
defendant's conduct, since such change, "although perhaps accomplishing

72. Id. at 1206 n.5 ("The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits have all found, explicitly or, in the case of the First Circuit, implicitly, that the
catalyst test survived Farrar.")(citing Payne v. Bd. of Educ., Cleveland City Sch., 88 F.3d
392, 397 n.2 (6th Cir. 1996); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732,751-52, 753 n.10 (9th Cir. 1995);
Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951 (10th
Cir. 1994); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 548-50 (3d Cir. 1994);
Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 17 F.3d 260, 263 n.2 (8th Cir.
1994); Craig v. Greg County, Texas, 988 F.2d 18, 20-21 (5th Cir. 1993); Paris v. U.S. Dep't
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 988 F.2d 236, 238 (1st Cir. 1993)).
73. Morris, 194 F.3d at 1206-07.
74. Id. at 1207.
75. Id.
76. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
77. James D. Brusslan, High Court Rejects 'Catalyst" Theory: Momentum Shifts to
Citizen Suit Defendants, 32 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1349 (July 6, 2001).
78. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600-01. This case involved the attorney fee provisions in
both the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006)), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 327
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12103 (2006)).
79. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602.
80. Id. at 603.

n_
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what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lack[ed] the
necessary judicial imprimatur....."81
B. The Catalyst Theory Under the "Whenever... Appropriate"
Standard
While the Buckhannon decision marked the end of the catalyst theory
under statutes that use the "prevailing party" standard in both civil
rights and other types of litigation,8 2 a few circuit courts of appeal and
at least one district court continued to apply the catalyst test to
environmental statutes whose fee-shifting provisions use the "Whenever
... appropriate" standard.'

Notably, the Eleventh Circuit is among

them. The Eleventh Circuit held in Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council
of Volusia County' that "the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon
does not prohibit use of the catalyst test as a basis for awarding
attorney's fees and costs under the... Endangered Species Act."' The
Eleventh Circuit, like the other courts who have similarly restricted
Buckhannon's application, reasoned that the "whenever... appropriate"
language in certain environmental statutes differed from the "prevailing
party" standard at issue in Buckhannon.6

81. Id. at 605.
82. Silecchia, supra note 3, at 42-44, 47-48 (citing cases from the First, Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Federal, and District of Columbia
Circuits that applied Buckhannon'sbar on the catalyst test to statutes besides the ones at
issue in Buckhannon).
83. Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty.
Council of'Volusia Cnty., 307 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2002); Ctr. for Biological Diversity
v. Norton, 262 F.3d 1077, 1083 (10th Cir. 2001); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Cal.
Native Plant Soc'y v. Carroll, 182 F. Supp. 2d 944, 951-52 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
84. 307 F.3d 1318 (2002).
85. Id. at 1327. The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(3)(B)(4) (2006),
states: "The court ... may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and
expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate."
86. Loggerhead Turtle, 307 F.3d at 1324-26; Sierra Club, 322 F.3d at 725-26; Norton,
262 F.3d at 1080 n.2; Carroll, 182 F. Supp. at 947. The "whenever ... appropriate"
standard is more common than the "prevailing party" standard in major environmental
statutes. See Silecchia, supra note 3, at 12; Ugalde, supra note 18, at 597. The Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c) (2006), the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), supra note 85, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C.
§ 1270(d) (2006), the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C.
1415(g)(4) (2006), the Public Health Service Act (Title XIV) (PHSA), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d)
(2006), the Noise Control Act (NCA), 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (2006), and the Clean Air Act
(CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f) (2006), all use a version of the "whenever ...
appropriate" standard. Although the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d), the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42
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As the legal history of the catalyst theory shows, courts have
predominantly applied this test under the "prevailing party" standard
in non-environmental litigation. In the midst of the catalyst theory's
development in civil rights litigation, however, the Supreme Court's
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club87 decision in 1983 marked an important
step in the test's development. That case specifically addressed the
"whenever ... appropriate" standard in environmental litigation 88and
how to apply it, but the Court did not consider the catalyst theory.
In Ruckelshaus, the plaintiffs challenged certain air pollution
regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
under the Clean Air Act.8 9 Although the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ultimately held the regulations were
reasonable-hence not making the plaintiffs "'prevailing parties,"' either
"in whole or in part"--it nevertheless awarded attorney fees to the
plaintiffs because they "substantially contribute[d] to the goals of the
[Clean Air] Act.""0 The court of appeals also noted that Sierra Club's
participation in the case significantly contributed to the "court's
education on each part91 of the [challenged] rule [and] informed its
decision on other parts."
Despite this reasoning the Supreme Court reversed the award of
attorney fees, concluding "the term 'appropriate' modifie[d] but [did] not
completely reject the traditional rule that a fee claimant must 'prevail'
before it may recover attorney's fees.' 2 The Court examined the
history of the "prevailing party" standard and determined that the Clean
Air Act's attorney fee provision, 3 which used the "Whenever ...
appropriate" standard, awarded attorney fees to "partiallyprevailing
parties-parties achieving some success, even if not major success. '
Thus, the Court implicitly rejected the argument that advancing the

U.S.C. § 9659(f) (2006), the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (2006),
and the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRTKA), 42 U.S.C.
11046(f) (2006), include the "whenever ...appropriate" language, these statutes also use
language invoking the "prevailing party" standard.
87. 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
88. Id. at 682; see also Silecchia, supra note 3, at 23.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006).
90. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
91. Id. at 41.
92. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 686.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (2006) ("In any judicial proceeding under this section, the court
may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees)
whenever it determines that such award is appropriate.").
94. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 687-88.
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relevant statute's goals constitutes success under the "whenever ...
appropriate" standard, but did not consider the catalyst theory.95
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
In Friendsof the Everglades II, the Eleventh Circuit gave only limited
review to the district court's decision to deny attorney fees to the
environmental plaintiffs. 96 The court decided the case under the abuse
of discretion standard.97 In the absence of clear error, application of an
incorrect legal standard, or adherence to improper procedures,98 the
court held the positive catalytic effect is an available means of awarding
attorney fees "to plaintiffs who do not obtain court-ordered relief."99
However, the court redefined what constitutes a positive effect.0 0 In
doing so, the court drew on the principles outlined above, but also set a
new direction in some respects for this circuit.
The court of appeals began by reiterating the traditional American
rule for attorney fees as set forth in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.-that
absent congressional authorization for shifting fees, each party is
responsible for its own costs.'
Because the Clean Water Act's feeshifting provision, which was at issue in the case, includes both the
"prevailing party" and the "whenever.. . appropriate" language,' 2 the
court addressed the interplay between these two standards by citing to
its own Loggerhead Turtle decision and the Supreme Court's Ruckelshaus precedent.' 0 '
The Clean Water Act's fee-shifting provision
states, in relevant part: "The court ... may award costs of litigation
(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing
party or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines
such award is appropriate."' 04 Comparably, the Endangered Species
Act's fee-shifting provision, which contains a purely "whenever ...
appropriate" standard and was at issue in Loggerhead Turtle, states:
"The court ... may award costs of litigation (including reasonable

95. See id.
96. 678 F.3d at 1201.
97. Id.

98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 1202-03.
Id.
Id. at 1201.

102. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
103. Friends of the Everglades II, 678 F.3d at 1202 ("As the Supreme Court has
explained, the term 'appropriate' modifies but does not completely reject the traditional
rule that a fee claimant must 'prevail' before it may recover attorney's fees.").
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
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attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court
determines such award is appropriate."0 5
Before analyzing the Clean Water Act's standard, the court of appeals
defined "prevailing party" using both the Supreme Court's meaning and
Eleventh Circuit precedent, as "one who prevails on 'any significant
issue' and thereby achieves some of the benefits sought by bringing
suit"0 6 and "who prevail[s] in What the lawsuit originally sought to
accomplish."0 7
The court also outlined two situations in Friends of the Everglades 11
in which attorney fees would be appropriate: "when the moving party
has advanced the goals of the Act"' O8 and when the plaintiff's suit has
a positive catalytic effect.'0 9 Read together, these two situations seem
to suggest that advancing the goals of the Clean Water Act, or any other
environmental statute for that matter, constitutes a positive change.
Furthermore, the original policy reason"0 used by at least two circuits
to support the catalyst theory in environmental litigation-that
indirectly causing any kind of legislative action on an environmental
statute results in a positive change for society-seems to support finding
a positive catalytic effect when legislation is changed due to a lawsuit."' This policy still supports such a finding here, despite the fact

105.

16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4).

106. Friendsof the Everglades11, 678 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass'n
v. Garland Ind. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-92 (1989)).
107. Id. (quoting Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp., 78 F.3d 1523, 1532 (11th Cir. 1996)).
108. Id. at 1202 (citing Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 885 F.2d
1276, 1279 (5th Cir. 1989)). Significantly, this formulation of what constitutes "appropriate"
in fee-shifting provisions differs from the Supreme Court's implied rejection of such a
definition in Ruckelshaus,where the plaintiff had contributed to the goals of the Clean Air
Act but nevertheless was denied attorney fees. See 463 U.S. at 687-88.
109. Friendsof the Everglades11,678 F.3d at 1202.
110. See, e.g., Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 36; Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222,224
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
("[Tihe dominant consideration is whether litigation by that party has served the public
interest ... ."); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[lit is
'appropriate' to make awards... where such award is in the public interest without regard
to the outcome of the litigation."); Metro. Wash. Coal. for Clean Air v. District of Columbia,
639 F.2d 802, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (same); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1338 (1st Cir. 1973) ("We are at liberty to consider not merely 'who
won' but what benefits were conferred."); see also Walter B. Russell, Il & Paul Thomas
Gregory, Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in Environmental Litigation:Citizen Suits and
the "Appropriate"Standard, 18 GA. L. RMv. 307, 355-57 (1984) (discussing the "public
interest" policy reason for awarding attorney fees to environmental plaintiffs under the
"whenever... appropriate" standard).
111. See Wilderness Society, 495 F.2d at 1033-35.
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that regulations, not legislation, were changed in this case. 12 Indeed,
environmental statutes' citizen suit provisions allow citizens to sue the
EPA Administrator when there is a failure to promulgate regulations,
which suggests that one of the goals of such statutes is to ensure
that
13
new rules are made, regardless of which party they benefit. 1
However, the court of appeals did not discuss general policy reasons
in its opinion."' Rather, the court relied heavily on the precedential
definitions of "prevailing party" and "whenever... appropriate." The
court simply stated that "[a]ll that can be said of the [plaintiff's] action
is that it led the EPA to promulgate rules contrary to the [plaintiff's]
position. We do not think this renders the [plaintiff] a 'substantially
prevailing' party; nor is this what was intended by the idea that a law
suit has a positive catalytic effect."" 5 The court further reasoned that,
while "Congress intended to permit courts to award fees 'to plaintiffs...
whose suit has a positive catalytic effect,' it did not intend for this
provision to extend to unsuccessful parties.""' The practical result is
a shift in what constitutes a positive change for purposes of the catalyst
theory. New regulations promulgated as a result of a plaintiff's lawsuit
but adverse to that plaintiff's position in the litigation are not a
sufficient change to receive attorney fees under the catalyst test in the
Eleventh Circuit."7
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Friends of the Everglades II
narrowed the circumstances under which environmental plaintiffs may
receive attorney fees." 8 Commentators agree that limiting the availability of attorney fees significantly impacts plaintiffs' lawsuits, although
much of this discussion arose in the early 2000s after Buckhannon was

112. Friendsof the EvergladesII, 678 F.3d at 1202. The plaintiffs' lawsuit in this case
resulted in EPA promulgating new regulations to more clearly define the language at issue
here, but those regulations were directly adverse to what the plaintiffs sought to achieve.
Id.; see also Friendsof the Everglades I, 570 F.3d at 1218-19.
113. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(aX2) ("[Amny citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf... against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator
to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the
Administrator.").
114. See Friendsof the Everglades11, 678 F.3d 1201-02.
115. Id. at 1202.
116. Id. (citing Loggerhead Turtle, 307 F.3d at 1326).
117. See id. at 1202-03.
118. See 678 F.3d at 1202-03.
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decided. 19 However, Buckhannon's implications are similar to those
of Friends of the Everglades II because both holdings restricted the
circumstances in which plaintiffs may receive attorney fees.120
Perhaps the most significant implication of the Eleventh Circuit's
holding is that environmental plaintiffs will reconsider bringing suit
because the financial risks of doing so are greater.1"' This is especially
true if a plaintiff is "motivated by factors other than simply claiming
victory .... The initiation of a lawsuit may be a strategic decision
intended to garner publicity and to prompt political or agency action
. .122 For instance, a plaintiff who would have brought suit to
achieve a clearer definition of a particular rule or regulation'23 may be
more reluctant to do so for fear of incurring significant legal fees.124

119. See Silecchia, supra note 3, at 5; Ugalde, supra note 18, at 608-14; William Funk,
Court Rejects "Catalyst Theory"for Qualifyingfor Attorneys Fees, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS,
Summer 2001, at 12 (stating that the practical effects of limiting the availability of
attorney fees may be significant in that a defendant may drag out the litigation as long as
possible); Brusslan, supra note 77, at 1349.
120. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610 (holding that "the 'catalyst theory' is not a
permissible basis for the award of attorney's fees under" the prevailing party standard);
Friendsof the Everglades 11, 678 F.3d at 1202 (holding that while "Congress intended to
permit courts to award fees 'to plaintiffs ... whose suit has a positive catalytic effect,' it
did not intend for this provision to extend to unsuccessful parties").
121. Ugalde, supra note 18, at 609 (stating that restricting the catalyst theory "will
result in an inevitable reluctance of environmental public interest groups to bring suit
because the risk involved in such litigation is now exacerbated"); Hope M. Babcock, How
JudicialHostility Toward Environmental Claims and Intimidation Tactics By Lawyers
Have Formed the Perfect Storm Against Environmental Clinics: What's the Big Deal About
Students and Chickens Anyway?, 25 J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 249, 285-86 (2010) ("While
recovery of attorneys' fees is important to public interest environmental plaintiffs, an
attorney fee award is crucial for an environmental clinic dependent on outside funds for
its continued existence. Since plaintiffs cannot recover money damages when they win an
environmental case, often the only way that environmental attorneys can be reimbursed
for their time and expenses is through court-awarded attorneys' fees and costs."); see also
Brusslan, supra note 77, at 1349 ("Environmental citizen groups often rely on the award
of attorneys' fees as a major incentive in filing their actions."); Jeanne Marie Zokovitch
Paben, Approaches to Environmental Justice:A Case Study of One Community's Victory,
20 S.CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUSTICE 235, 244 (2011) ("A prevailing party's ability to recoup
costs in environmental cases has been a driving force in allowing many environmental
justice cases to be brought.").
122. Ugalde, supra note 18, at 609.
123. See Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply With the Law, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1084 (1993) (stating that strategic behavior is the reason litigation
occurs, and "[olne form of strategic behavior is a defendant's desire to litigate in order to
•.. change the legal rule in a desired direction").

124. Russell & Gregory, supra note 110, at 326-27 (describing why environmental
litigation fees are so expensive); Ugalde, supra note 17, at 610 ("Environmental litigation
is extremely costly and requires substantial resources rarely at the disposal of environmen-
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A defendant may avoid paying attorney fees by successfully lobbying an
agency to adopt new rules favorable to its position in a lawsuit but
adverse to that of the plaintiff. A plaintiff, then, still must pay its own
attorney fees, despite having prompted the agency to change its
applicable regulations. Fewer opportunities for recovering fees also
means that attorneys may be less willing to represent environmental
groups because such representation is often handled on a contingency fee
basis.'2 5 Even in particularly strong cases with a high probability of
success on the merits, plaintiffs who would otherwise be encouraged to
bring such suits may be wary to do so with a diminished probability of
recovery under the catalyst theory. 2 ' Therefore, environmental groups

and their lawyers will likely reconsider bringing suit when faced with
the possibility of a costly expenditure combined with less opportunity for

recouping those expenses. 2 '
This likely decrease in the number of environmental citizen suits leads
to the second important implication: reduced enforcement of, and
compliance with, environmental laws.' 5 One purpose of citizen suits
and their accompanying fee-shifting provisions is to aid agencies, which
have limited resources, by enforcing environmental laws.'29 Fewer

tal public interest groups.").
125. Martin A. McCrory, Standing in the Ever-ChangingStream: The Clean WaterAct,
Article III Standing, and Post-ComplianceAdjudication, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 73, 130
(2001).
126. See David T. Buente, Jr., William E. Gerard & Joel F. Visser, Limited Oversight:
The Role of the Federal Courts Vis-d-vis the Environmental Protection Agency in Air
Pollution Control Under the CleanAirAct, 21 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POLY F. 309, 329 (2011).
127. Ugalde, supra note 18, at 610; see Brusslan, supra note 77, at 1349 (stating that
"diminish[ing] the prospect of [attorneys' fees] ... [has] a chilling effect on the filing of
citizen suits"); see also Buente, Gerard & Visser, supra note 126, at 329 (discussing how
the prospect of an attorney fees award "may play a significant role in the frequency with
which [environmental] claims are brought").
128. Ugalde, supra note 18, at 610-12; Brusslan, supra note 77, at 1349.
129. See Ugalde, supra note 18, at 610-12; Mark Seidenfeld, An Apology for
AdministrativeLaw in the ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 215, 236 (2000) (noting
that "citizen suits have been used to provide meaningful enforcement without the agency
having to spend its resources"); Beverly McQueary Smith, The Viability of Citizens' Suits
Under the Clean Water Act After Gwaltney of Smithfteld v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 56 (1990) ("Since no regulatory agency at the federal or state
level can or will have adequate resources to ensure comprehensive enforcement of
[environmental] statutes, citizen suits are a mechanism to turn over a portion of the
burden of law enforcement to members of the private sector."); Jonathan H. Adler, Stand
or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing,and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POLly F. 39, 43 (2001) (noting that "agencies are constrained by scarce resources, limited
information, and political pressures[,]... [so] Congress enacted environmental citizen-suit
provisions to help address these concerns by enabling local citizens and environmental
groups to supplement governmental enforcement efforts.").
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private entities willing to bring suit thus results in less enforcement of
environmental statutes. Because citizen suits fill a "necessary void" in
the enforcement of environmental regulations, "allowing compensation
to citizen groups through the award of fees furthers [the] goals [of citizen
suits] by providing an incentive to continue to augment agency
enforcement." 3 ° Furthermore, willing violators of these laws are more
likely to continue their illegal behavior once they know that potential
plaintiffs are less likely to file suit.'' Therefore, limiting plaintiffs'
chances of recovering attorney fees under the catalyst theory will likely
result in both decreased environmental enforcement and increased
violations.'3 2
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit noted in response to Buckhannon, well
before Friends of the Everglades II was decided, that eliminating the
catalyst rule "would cripple the citizen suit provision" of environmental
statutes. 133 While the catalyst test is still a viable means of recovery
in the Eleventh Circuit, Friends of the Everglades II curtailed the
theory's application.' 3 Narrowing the catalyst rule may not completely
cripple the test but will likely leave it to limp along instead.
The "whenever ... appropriate" standard and fee-shifting provisions
generally not only give defendants an incentive to follow the law, but
also provide an impetus to settle. 135 Specifically, "[tihe catalyst theory
enhance[s] these incentives by giving substance to the fee-shifting
provisions."' 36 For example, prior to Friends of the Everglades II, a
defendant had an incentive to settle a lawsuit if an agency began to
consider changing the regulations at issue in the case. Such rulemaking,
undertaken as a result of the lawsuit, would have entitled the plaintiff
to attorney fees, 137 thus imposing a cost on the defendant regardless
of whether the defendant won the suit. After this case, the defendant
will likely have a greater incentive to lobby the agency to promulgate
rules in the defendant's favor-rather than to settle the suit-because
new regulations adverse to the plaintiff provide the defendant an escape
hatch under the catalyst theory. Thus, narrowing the availability of the
catalyst theory will likely create a disincentive to settle.'38

130. Ugalde, supra note 18, at 612.
131. See id. at 611 ("Defendants may find it more advantageous economically to
continue violating the law because of the reduced risk of a fees award.").
132. See id. at 610-12; Brusslan, supra note 77, at 1349.
133. Loggerhead Turtle, 307 F.3d at 1327.
134. 678 F.3d at 1202-03.
135. Ugalde, supra note 18, at 612; Hylton, supra note 123, at 1121.
136. Ugalde, supra note 18, at 612 (citing McCrory, supra note 125, at 130-31).
137. See Loggerhead Turtle, 307 F.3d at 1325.
138. See Ugalde, supra note 18, at 612.
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Although courts have generally allowed recovery under the catalyst
theory for statutes employing the "whenever ... appropriate" standard,'39 few decisions have given clear contours to the test's limits. At
this time the Eleventh Circuit is the only circuit that has directly
addressed what constitutes a positive change for purposes of the catalyst
theory. The general lack of federal appellate court action may not
prompt the Supreme Court to address the issue of the catalyst rule's
viability under the "whenever... appropriate" standard, especially given
the fact that the Supreme Court has already denied at least one petition
for certiorari to address
the catalyst theory under the "Whenever . . .
140
appropriate" standard.
Congressional leadership, on the other hand, may be more appropriate
than judicial intervention for addressing the specifics of the catalyst
theory.1'' A legislative lead, rather than a judicial lead, is likely the
better avenue for ensuring that environmental plaintiffs receive attorney
fees 4 2 because a narrow approach for awarding fees-such as the one
taken by the Eleventh Circuit in Friendsof the EvergladesII--"prevents
courts from straying from the 'American Rule' without a clear congressional mandate."'
Legislative action is important for areas like environmental law in which plaintiffs often sue the government "because courts
must respect sovereign immunity by declining to expand Congressional
waivers of it too broadly."1'
Furthermore, clear legislative action gives plaintiffs the benefit of a
bright-line rule's predictability regarding attorney fee awards under the
catalyst theory.' 45 In turn, a clear delineation as to when attorney fees
are available removes the ambiguity about whether the catalyst test
applies and thus decreases litigation. 146
Arguably, the Eleventh
Circuit's holding may appear to draw such a bright-line rule. However,
the fact that no other circuit has addressed what constitutes a positive
effect under the catalyst test begs the question, and thus could actually
create litigation. 47
Therefore, a clear Congressional statement

139. See Silecchia, supra note 3, at 58.
140. EPA v. Sierra Club, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
141. Silecchia, supra note 3, at 59.
142. See id.
143. Id. (quoting Michael W. Kelly, Weakening Title III of the Americans With
Disabilities Act: The Buckhannon Decision and Other Developments Limiting Private
Enforcement, 10 ELDER L.J. 361, 371 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
144. Silecchia, supranote 3, at 59 (citing Adam Babich, Fee ShiftingAfter Buckhannon,
32 ENvTL. L. REP. 10, 137 (2002)).
145. See id. at 60.
146. See id.
147. See generally id. at 59-60.
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regarding a sufficient positive effect under the catalyst theory will likely
give predictability for attorney fees and stem possible litigation in the
future, both of which are benefits for environmental plaintiffs.
LINDSAY SCHAFER

